Certificateless signature is one of the most important security primitives which can be used to solve the key escrow problem existing in ID-based 
Introduction
In 1984, the identity-based public key cryptosystem (ID-PKC) was introduced by Shamir [1] , which was used to solve the certificate management problem in traditional public key cryptosystem. In the ID-PKC, the Key Generator Centre (KGC) generates a private key for the accepted user who registers in the KGC with his/her identity, while the user's identity is taken as the corresponding public key. For example, the user's name or email can be used as his/her public key, so the system doesn't need any public key certificate. Therefore, it can efficiently solve the certificate management problem suffered by the traditional public key cryptosystem. But, in the ID-PKC, all the users must trust the KGC, since he/she masters all the users' secret keys. In fact, in the internet, none of the participants can be fully trusted. This means that a malicious KGC can forge any user's signature, since he/she knows all the users' private keys.
To solve the key escrow problem existing in ID-PKC, in 2003, the certificateless public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) was proposed [2] . In the CL-PKC, a user's private key consists of two parts, secret value and partial private key. The secret value is master by the user, while the partial private key is shared by both the user and KGC. Then, ID-PKC can avoid KGC having access to a user's private key, so the key escrow problem existing in the ID-PKC can be ingeniously solved. This means that certificateless signature can also solve the key escrow problem existing in ID-based signature. Then, based on the idea in [2] , many certificateless signature schemes (CLS) were proposed. Some of the early CLS schemes were not secure. For example, all the schemes proposed in [2] [3] [4] [5] were insecure against type I adversary [6] . Because bilinear pairings have good cryptographic properties, some CLS schemes based bilinear pairings were proposed [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , also. These pairing-based schemes have been proved to be secure in the formal security model. However, in these pairing-based schemes, heavy pairing operations were required. According to the result in [13] , one pairing operation was about 11110 multiplications in finite field F 3
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. In 2011, He et al. presented a CLS scheme without bilinear pairings [14] . Generally, it is believed that the efficiency of CLS without pairings will be more efficient than those paring-based schemes. To improve the efficiency of CLS, a number of CLS schemes without pairings were proposed [15] [16] [17] . Unfortunately, these schemes were vulnerable to type II adversary [18, 19] . Recently, Yeh et al. [20] presented a CLS scheme without pairings, and claimed that their scheme was efficient and practical for mobile communication. Nevertheless, in their security proof, the discrete logarithm value x of the given discrete logarithm instance was not derived. Hence, the security proof of his scheme is not sufficient. How to construct a secure and efficient CLS without pairings is still an open problem. On the other hand, different from the constructions of all the CLS schemes discussed above, the CLS proposed in [21] is a classical one based on RSA [22] .
It should be noted that the security of all the CLS schemes discussed above is based on only one security problem: discrete logarithm problem, or computing Diffie-Hellman problem, or factoring problem. In this paper, we will present a CLS scheme whose security depends on two mathematical hard problems: discrete logarithm and factoring problems. That is, only both of the discrete logarithm and factoring problems is solved can our CLS scheme is broken. We will prove the security of our scheme under formal security model. Compared with the scheme proposed in [21] that its security depends on only one hard problem; our scheme has a better security. Compared with the scheme proposed in [23] , our scheme is a certificateless one, which doesn't need any certificate, and it doesn't need to send any public key certificate to the verifier before verifying a signature. On the other hand, our scheme is an efficient one. Especially, in our scheme, it is very efficient to sign a certificateless signature, since there is not any exponential modular computation during the signing phase when the pre-computation is ignored, and it needs only two exponential operations during the verification phase. Then, compared with the other schemes of this kind, our scheme has better security and efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we propose our new certificateless scheme. In section 3, the security analysis of our scheme is discussed. In section 4, the efficiency and security comparison between our scheme and the other schemes of this kind is analyzed. At last, in section 5, we conclude.
Our Certificateless Signature Scheme 2.1. Complexity Assumptions Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).
Let N=pq be a RSA modular number satisfying p=2p′+1, q=2q′+1. g∈Z N * is a generator of G by order p′q′. Given the parameters g, y, N, the discrete logarithm problem is to compute the exponent x such that y=g x mod N.
Throughout this paper, we assume it is hard to solve DLP.
Definition 2 (Factoring Problem (FP)).
Let N=pq, where p and q are two large primes with security parameter λ. It is hard to factor N into p and q.
Our New Certificateless Signature Scheme
Setup: Let p and q be two large primes, where p=2p′+1, q=2q′+1, and p′ and q′ are both large primes, too. N=p·q is the modular number. Assume it is hard to factor N. On the other hand, H:{0, 1}*→Z Q and H 1 :{0, 1}*×{0, 1}*→Z N are two secure hash functions, where Z Q is the set of quadratic residue under modular N.
Partial private key extract: Given the user's identity ID, KGC calculates h=H(ID) mod
N and S ID = h mod N. Note that the square root S ID of h can be computed by Rabin algorithm [24] . Next, KGC returns the partial private key S ID to the user. Set private key: The user randomly chooses his/her secret value x∈Z N , and adopts the pair (S ID , x) as his/her private key.
Set public key: Given identity ID and the secret value x, the user computes y=h x mod N as his/her own public key, where h=H(ID).
Sign: Given a message m, the user chooses a random number k∈Z N and computes r=(S ID ) k mod N, l=H 1 (m, r) and,
The signature on the message m is σ=(t, r, y). Verify: Given the message m and the signature σ=(t, r, y), the verifier computes h=H(ID) and l=H 1 (m, r). Then, he/she verifies whether the equation, 
Holds. If it holds, the verifier accepts the signature, or he/she refuses it. The correctness of our scheme can be proved as follows.
Security Analysis
For a certificateless signature, there are two kinds of adversaries with different capabilities [2] . Type I adversary acts as a dishonest user, who can replace any entity's public key with unique value, but he/she does not know the master secret key of KGC. Type II adversary acts a malicious KGC, who has an opposite capability that he/she knows the master secret key of KGC but cannot replace any entity's public key.
In addition, in [3] , Type I and Type II adversaries are also classified into three categories: normal, strong and super levels. These three categories of adversaries have different capabilities. The normal-level Type I (or II) adversary is able to learn valid signatures. The strong-level Type I (or II) adversary can replace a public key to forge a valid signature when the adversary possesses a corresponding secret value. The super-level Type I (or II) adversary has the ability to learn valid signatures for a replaced public key without any submission. In this paper, we consider the super-level adversary in our security analysis.
By the discrete logarithm and factoring assumptions, we can prove that our signature is secure against the super-level Type I adversary and Type II adversary. Before presenting the security poof of our scheme, we first review the forking lemma [25] . Lemma 1. [Forking Lemma] [25] In the random oracle mode, for a generic signature scheme, let F be a Turing machine whose input only consists of public data. Assume that F can produce a valid signature (m, σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) within a time bound T by un-negligible probability ε≥10(n s +1)(n h +n s )/q, where n h and n s are the numbers of queries that F can ask to the random oracle and the signing oracle respectively. If the triple (σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) can be simulated without knowing the secret key, with an indistinguishable distribution probability, then there is another machine which has control over the machine obtained from F replacing the signing oracle by simulation and produces two valid signatures (m, σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) and (m, σ 1 , h', 2   ) such that h≠h′ in the expected time less than 120686·n h ·T/ε. Theorem 1. In the random oracle mode, for our CLS scheme, let Type I adversary have a polynomial-time algorithm α that can produce a valid signature (t, r, y) such that h t =r 2 y l mod N within a time bound T by un-negligible probability ε≥10(n s +1)(n h +n s )/q, where n h is the number of queries that α can ask to the random oracle H 1 , and n s is the number of queries that α can ask to the signing oracle. If the signature (t, r, y) can be simulated without knowing the private key, with an indistinguishable distribution probability, then there is another machine which can solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem and Factoring Problem in the expected time less than 120686·n h ·T/ε.
Proof. Suppose Type I Adversary has a polynomial-time algorithm α that can break our scheme with non-negligible advantage ε, and H, H 1 are two random oracles. Let β be the challenger.
In the initialization phase, the system setups the public parameters, the modular number N, the public key y, and the hash function H and H 1 , all of which are the same as those described in section 2. Now, β's goal is to solve both hard problems: discrete logarithm problem and factoring problem. He/she tries to compute out discrete logarithm of y to the base h and to factor the RSA modular N into prime numbers p and q.
In the Query phase, the following oracle queries are adaptively issued by α, and each query is unique. From the simulation, the challenger can successfully answer all the queries without being detected. Then, the algorithm α believes that he/she has successfully attacked our scheme. Note that in forking lemma, l is the hash value of (m, r). And l only depends on m and r. Then, β can simulates another machine by using the forking lemma, and produces two valid signatures (t, r, y) and (t*, r, y) for the target user with identity ID and public key y. From equation (2), we have:
Where h can be seemed as the identity of the garget user with identity ID and public key y. From the equation (1), (3) and (4), we can get:
Where l≠l*. Therefore, from equations (5) and (6), we can derive: r h y h y N (9) from equation (7) and (8) . Therefore, we can factor the RSA modular N by computing:
From Theorem 1, it is easy to get Theorem 2 as follow. Theorem 2. Our certificateless signature scheme can achieve existential unforgeability against a super-level Type I adversary in the random oracle model. Only both of the discrete logarithm and factoring problems are solved can our signature be broken.
Similarly, we have Theorem 3 as follow. Theorem 3. Our certificateless signature scheme can achieve existential unforgeability against a super-level Type II adversary in the random oracle model. Only both of the discrete logarithm and factoring problems are solved can our signature be broken.
Proof. By using the proof similar to that of Theorem 2, we can prove that our CLS scheme can achieve existential unforgeability against a super-level Type II adversary. Note that Type II adversary acts as a malicious KGC. Hence, a super-level Type II adversary can query the partial private key of any user, including the target user. Then, the difference is that in theorem 3, the super-level Type II adversary cannot mount a public key replacement attack to the target user, since this kind of adversary can query the partial private key of the target user.
Efficiency and Security Comparison
In this part, we compare our scheme with the similar schemes of this kind [21, 23] as Table 1 . First, we make a security comparison among the similar schemes. The security of scheme proposed in [21] depends on only one hard problem. From the security proof in [21] , we find the signature in [21] will be broken in case that either RSA problem or discrete logarithm problem is broken, while only both of discrete logarithm and factoring problems are broken can our signature can be forged. Then, compared with the scheme in [21] , our scheme has a better security. The security of the scheme proposed by Verma and Sharma [23] is also based on discrete logarithm and factoring problems. However, the security of their scheme cannot be proved in the formal security model. What is more, their scheme is a certificate-based one, in which the security of key management has to be considered. On the other hand, before verifying the signature in [23] , the public key certificate should be transmitted to the verifier. Now, we compare the efficiency of the similar schemes. In a signature scheme, compared with the other operations under modular, the exponential operation is more timeconsuming. So, for a signature scheme, the fewer exponential operations should be used. Then, we mainly compare the numbers of exponential operation and hash operation among the similar schemes. From the comparison in Table 2 , it is found that our scheme has the fewest exponential operations. Then, compared with the other schemes of this kind, our scheme is more efficient. In fact, in our scheme, the parameter r in the signing phase can be pre-computed and stored before signing a signature. Hence, the exponential operation in the signing phase of our scheme can be ignored. This means that it will be very efficient to sign a signature for our scheme, since there is not any exponential operation when the pre-computation is ignored. 
Conclusion
Due to the virtues of CLS, many certificateless signatures have been proposed. However, the security of most CLS schemes depends on only mathematical hard problem. In this paper, we present a new CLS scheme, whose security depends on two complexity assumptions: DLP and FP. That is, only both DLP and FP are broken can our signature be forged. On the other hand, we show our scheme has the fewest exponential operations during both signing phase and verifying phase. Therefore, compared with the other schemes of this kind, our scheme has a better security and efficiency.
(1) As shown in the Table 1 , our scheme is a CLS one, and it has II security level. And we present the formal security proof for our scheme in the security model. Then, compared with the schemes in [22, 23] , our scheme is more secure.
(2) As shown in the Table 2 , our scheme has the fewest exponential operations during both the signing phase and verifying phase. Especially, there is not any exponential modular computation when the pre-computation is ignored. Then, for our scheme, it will be more efficient to sign and verify a signature.
